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EXAMINATION OF THE PROCESS OF THE IRAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AS A POLITICAL ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENT
Author: Ayşe Betül FERİK
The Islamic Revolution in Iran coincides with periods when politics and diplomacy witnessed highly turbulent and complex events. The Revolution can be briefly defined as the destruction of the Pahlavi Dynasty and the establishment of a theocratic Republic based on Islamic law and Shiite sect led by Khomeini. [1]
As a political elite with an ‘open door’ on the road to revolution, one can talk about the policies of Prime Minister Mohammad MOSSADEGH. It was already known that he was one of the leaders of an anti-shah opposition when he declared the dynasty of Shah Reza PAHLAVI. In the Pahlavi monarchy, it could not be mentioned that the people took a role in the administration. Until the late 1930s and 1940s, the western powers had great influence over Iran, and Iran was making many concessions. One of the most important of these was the concession agreement with the British Oil Company Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Namely, the British company would trade the oil it extracted from Iran itself and would give Iran a very small share. This caused a great reaction especially in nationalist, left-wing and Islamist sections. In this period, Mossadegh, who opposed this policy, started the National Front Movement, which demanded the nationalization of oil, and garnered great support from the people with this movement. Even the ulema gave a fatwa on this issue and supported the nationalization movement of oil and the National Front. After a long and painful process, Mossadegh was appointed as prime minister by the Shah in 1951. Although Mossadegh was a democratically elected leader, a coup attempt that known as Operation Ajax, backed by the UK and the US intelligence agency, the CIA, could not be prevented. Mossadegh was dismissed and shah rule and monarchy became the regime type of the country again. Besides, the Shah’s regime was a kind of dictatorship and the reforms and innovations carried out by Mosaddegh were reinstated. The coup had many military, economic, diplomatic and political consequences. The Shah began to cooperate with the CIA and the United Kingdom, attacks and arrests took place against members of the National Front Movement led by Mossadegh and the Tudeh Party, which was a big supporter of Mosaddegh but fell out with Mosaddegh during the coup process. The most important result of the coup was that many people, especially Ayatollah KHOMEINI, turned against the dictatorship of the Shah and led the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution in this way.[2]
However, the conditions of the revolution and the circumstances that led to the revolution, Iran’s domestic and foreign policy and social situation at that time should be considered in order to examine the revolution. In the period, the effect of the Cold War cannot be ignored, the tension created by the Cold War also recurred in the Middle East countries like Iran.[3] [4]
In fact, the policies of Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s period were shaped by the Cold War period, and he struggled to maintain control in the country after the Second World War. He introduced some new laws to ensure modernization and westernization in the country, and these laws even provided a step towards the revolution under the name of White Revolution. It can be said that the White Revolution was made in response to the Red Revolution. This revolution includes a land reform and a kind of national structure and the right to be elected. However, the landlords, the ulama and the farmer class took an anti-Pahlavi stance, thinking that this revolution would change the traditional lifestyle of the rural people who made a living from agriculture and that the revolution interfered in every aspect of social and economic life.[5] [6]
The reaction of these sections, who were already against the Shah due to the coup and economic and structural problems, increased with this revolution.[7] The symbol of this reaction was Ayatollah KHOMEINI, who was at the head of the anti-shah Islamist faction, and he was even given the title ‘Merci-i Taklit’, which means ‘to be imitated, to be taken as an example’. The reason why Khomeini was so influential in opposition to the Shah was that he boldly expressed his opposition, embellished his protest against the Shah with both leaflets and speeches. He organized the people on this issue and initiated the uprising, and even gave a fatwa together with the Ulema, who was greatly influenced by him. Khomeini was arrested for his opposition but was released after the ulema’s suppression. Instead of silencing Khomeini, his arrest helped him speak more and strengthen his opposition. The Shah’s administration, which could not put a stop to Khomeini’s opposition, sentenced Khomeini to death penalty as the final decision, but turned the sentence into exile due to the reaction of the ulama. Meanwhile, the reaction to the Shah by leftists, communists, liberals, libertarians, Islamists and rural people had grown. Khomeini, who was sent into exile, continued his organizing and planning activities in exile, and managed to gain supporters in this process. In this process perspective, it can be said that the situation arises from a grievance felt within the country within the sociopsychological framework. The Shah’s connections with foreign powers, a kind of ‘rentie state’ structure, economic troubles, structural and political problems, the segregation brought by the White Revolution, and the effect of the coup against Mosaddegh, which was a political problem in particular, caused different grievances in different social segments, and the solution path of each segment was different. Khomeini, however, was recognized by all segments as a brave and grounded, knowledgeable leader, and became a symbol of opposition to the Shah.[8]
During this period, there was a clear class divide in the country, and this division caused Iranian citizens to be treated as second-class people. The Shah’s connections with foreign powers were mentioned above, but these connections were also reflected in social relations.
Shah Pahlavi was doing his best to prevent the organization and social upheaval provided by Khomeini. As a matter of fact, if he could not prevent this opposition majority, he would lose both his power and his reputation. He described the Shah, who already had an oppressive and dictatorial regime, as a ‘Yazid’ because the Shah was opposing him, who was almost a religious figure. After these events, the Shah increased the pressure even more. The Shah even issued a statement saying that Khomeini was a spy, and that he was not an Iranian but a Hindu. Although he thought that this declaration would organize the people against Khomeini and increase the support for him, on the contrary, it caused the people to defend Khomeini and increased support for him. At this stage, people saw the Shah’s apparent opposition to Khomeini and took to the streets. The Shah asked the Iraqi government to expel Khomeini, who was already in exile. For this reason, Khomeini was exiled from Iraq and went to France and Paris. However, the public’s support for Khomeini continued, even dozens of people lost their lives in the protests that took place in the streets, and police and army support was increased by the Shah. Unable to prevent the protests, the Shah declared martial law and a state of emergency throughout the country, and imposed curfews in major cities and states.
Despite the curfews, martial law and the state of emergency, the people continued to protest and demonstrate. As the mobilization of the people continued, the suppression methods applied by the Shah became harder and tighter. Especially the events that took place in the Jale Square had great effects in the history of Iran and became one of the important elements that increased the opposition to the Shah on the way to the Islamic Revolution. The incident took place in Jale Square, one of the most important streets of Iran. The people who resisted the curfew and wanted to continue their protests gathered in this square. However, by the order of the Shah, a high level of army, police and military intervention took place in order to expel the people gathered in the square and dozens of civilian protesters lost their lives in the Jale Square. This bloody day, which takes place in Jale Square, is also called ‘Black Friday’. Even after this bloody day, the people started to reorganize with the non-stop protests and demonstrations.
In this period, the American President Jimmy CARTER’s expression of his support for the Shah was met with discontent in the society and caused the protests to accelerate. Education, production, social activities and diplomacy in the country were almost stopped due to protests, union-supported strikes were started in factories and security was at zero point.[9]
Although the Shah tried to maintain his power and monarchy, every maneuver he made was hurting him more. People no longer wanted the Pahlavi monarchy, even at the cost of their lives. As mentioned before, the people, who saw Khomeini as a symbol of the revolution and opposition to the Shah, wanted Khomeini to return from exile. Meanwhile, the Shah, who could not stand up to the uprisings of the people, left the country with his wife and the revolution process accelerated.[10] The public’s desire to bring Khomeini back was growing, making protests across the country bloodier and fiercer. Khomeini was recalled to Iran by the order of the then Prime Minister Shahpur BAKHTIYAR, who wanted to stop the conflicts, and was greeted with great celebration. With Khomeini’s return to Iran, the process of acceptance of the revolution ended and its political process began.[11]
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah KHOMEINI, living in Paris, returned to Tehran from exile. According to some sources, at least 2 million people welcomed him. Among the hundreds of thousands of people were Iranians from different walks of life, such as students, civil servants, intellectuals, merchants, workers, shopkeepers and the clergy.[12] As a matter of fact, Khomeini first put an end to the monarchy regime as all segments wanted. However, Khomeini’s expectation from the revolution would not fulfill the demands of every class that supported him. As a matter of fact, he subsequently established an ‘Islamic regime’ by signing a regime change that would astonish those who supported him. On the way to the revolution, the existence of the Islamic section, ulama and pro-Shiite people was undeniable, but leftist, communist, nationalist and liberal people also played a major role in the progress of the revolution. In fact, according to some academics, the Islamic Revolution in Iran was highly influenced by Marxism: Historian Dr. Roham ALVANDI describes how the opposition to the Shah in Iran was influenced by Marxist ideology:[13]
“The younger generation in Iran gave up the concept of democracy or liberal constitutionalism and started to turn to more radical concepts such as class revolution, anti-imperialism and armed struggle, as it gained popularity in the Third World. Iranian Muslim intellectuals and clerics borrowed from Marxism to organize the masses against the Pahlavi monarchy, poisoned by Westernism, and to reimagine Shiite Islam as a revolutionary ideology in order to return to an imaginary authentic ‘Islamic essence’.”[14]
It has been mentioned above that not only Islamic thought is out of question on the road to revolution. So, why was an Islamic regime established as a result of the revolution instead of a leftist or nationalist regime? The answer to this question can actually be sought in the process from the past to the revolution. Because it can be observed that the left part weakened in the process from the past to the revolution. The first stage of weakening was the termination of the activities of the pro-Soviet and left-wing Tudeh Party, one of the supporters of the Mossadegh regime, as a result of the coup against Mossadegh.[15] Since this was a kind of inhibition of political activity, leftist groups could no longer be represented.[16] In addition, the fact that Khomeini, who is seen as the leader of the revolution, was an Islamic leader and received great support from the Ulema throughout all his activities, caused the revolution to progress in an Islamic perspective. As a matter of fact, the Ulama have a great place in the Shiite sect of Islam and have a say in fiqh (Islamic law) and the theory of the state of Islam. Since the issues in which the ulama have a say have an important place in a state regime, Khomeini’s support of the ulama made him an important politician beyond being an important Islamic leader and theologian.[17]
Khomeini abolished the monarchy and a few years later, in a referendum, he introduced the regime of the Islamic Republic. With this regime, the country would witness a major cultural reform. Khomeini, as mentioned above, is a revolutionary Islamic politician, and he implemented the revolution not only by changing the regime but also by integrating Islam into all segments of life, as political Islam commands, such as social life, economy, gender, education, health, and the army. For this reason, a kind of cultural revolution took place in the country.[18] However, Khomeini’s first concern was the existence of leftist, communist and nationalist groups that had led him on the way to revolution.[19] In any case, a nationalist understanding is completely against political Islam and the values of the religion of Islam. For example, while national values and culture, race and ethnicity are important in a nationalist perspective, the political Islamic perspective has a completely ummahist perspective. This is explained by the fact that nationalism is based on citizenship, while political Islam is based on a faith-based sense of belonging. Islam is an integrative and universal religion according to its teachings, and political Islam is obliged to practice it. For this reason, nationalism and political Islam are two extremely contradictory phenomena.[20] Therefore, Khomeini, while continuing his existence in the Islamic Republic, first ended the existence of nationalist groups. Afterwards, he made anti-leftist and anti-Marxist discourses and said that there is no relation between Islam and Marxism. Although there are considerable similarities between Islam and Marxism; Islam presents the equality offered by Marxism and the opposition of capitalism and imperialism from an Islamic perspective. An important difference is that Marxism advocates not having any religion. In addition, there are pragmatic elements in the understanding of political Islam, which is the application of Islam to politics. Claiming these differences, Khomeini started to work to destroy leftist and Marxist groups in universities. During this process, dozens of civilians were killed, exiled or imprisoned and sentenced to harsh conditions such as torture and rape. In this way, even today, the existence of a leftist group in Iran has not been witnessed. Some scholars state that during the revolution in Iran, leftists, communists and nationalists did not ‘take political Islam seriously’, emphasizing Khomeini’s revolutionary and anti-Shah presence rather than his Islamic presence.[21]
In addition, there are other reasons why people trust Khomeini so much and that even non-political Islamists see him as a figure of revolution. For example, economic troubles were one of the greatest discontents that existed in society since the Shah’s reign. As mentioned above, Iranian citizens were treated as second-class citizens in their own country, and the Shah’s agreements with foreign powers made the country dependent on foreign countries, both commercially and diplomatically. Khomeini must have observed this situation of the people well, but when he returned from exile, he announced that he would make changes to improve the situation of the people, that public transportation would be free, health services would be provided to the people free of charge and education would be free, that is, there was a kind of welfare state understanding. What should be noted here is the sociological structure of the Iranian people, as the literacy rate of the Iranian people at that time was quite low and most of the people lived in the provinces. Their biggest problem was poverty, and the Shah did not give them the privileges they wanted. It was not difficult for them to believe Khomeini’s promises without questioning them.[22]
However, the reforms made by Khomeini did not go in the direction the people expected, at least for the certain sections of the people. As mentioned above, Khomeini, who started his reforms by punishing those who opposed him, continued this type of policy in other areas of life. As it is known, the role of university professors and students in political processes is quite large, many people who took part in the revolution were actually university students. Khomeini must have been aware of this since he started a great controlling in universities. According to him, no ‘western, modern and secular’ view should have taken place in a country governed by Islamic rules, namely sharia. However, this is a contradiction, as political Islam is a modern and urban ideology. It has a unique system of thought, and this system is not different from other modern ideologies. Apart from this view, Khomeini acted with the desire to destroy every western, secular and modern thought. While people expected education to be free and equal, Khomeini followed a completely different path. First of all, he expelled the dissident academics who engaged in such activities in universities and sent them to prison or exile, and appointed academics who were his supporters instead. In fact, this situation led to the decline of education in Iran. Iran was a country that had an important place especially in the field of literature and music in the past, but it can be said that this is no longer the case after the revolution.[23] [24]
In addition, the issue of gender equality, which was on the agenda especially in 2022, has become a highly controversial issue in Iran during and after the Khomeini government. Khomeini, with the policies he pursued, forced women to cover up and introduced the dress code as a condition for university education. In fact, declarations were published advocating that women should stay at home and serve their husbands instead of being educated. A moral police practice was introduced, women were prohibited from traveling or going out without a married or related man, and the decision to continue education in a harem-greeting manner was published. The moral police go around the street in civilian fashion, checking the status of women and making sure they’re not doing anything ‘illegal’. If a woman behaves ‘unlawfully’, she can be punished by stoning. Women live under a lot of oppression in Iran, and this oppression has grown into protest when the morality police killed a woman named Mahsa AMINI in 2022.
In addition, all music genres except religious music and recitation of the Qur’an were banned, and apostasy was punished with death penalty or torture. The subtext of all these prohibitions was that the existence of anything thought to be western, modern and secular in society was called ‘opposing Islam’ or ‘anti-religion, atheism, infidelity’. In this section, it would be correct to talk about a structural feature of the Shiite sect: As a matter of fact, unlike the Sunnis, the ulema have an important place in the Shiites. The ulama do not occupy that much space among Sunni Muslims, on the contrary, they take the Qur’an and prophets as symbols of their beliefs instead of the ulama. This ulama emphasis in Shiites will also be seen in the belief of 12 Imams. According to Shiites, Khomeini is a disguised imam. In other words, in the Shiite belief, Khomeini has become a part of the religion, so to oppose a policy of him means to oppose Islam and Shiism.[25]
A Perspective on the Revolution
In the process of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, we see that social mobilization occurs against a monarchical order. This explains why, apart from a short-term ‘open door’ provided by Mossadegh during the mobilization process in Iran, no political opportunity was provided to the social movement by the political elites. As a matter of fact, a gap is observed between the expectations of the society and the practices of the Shah, and the Shah did not leave any open door for mobilization. On the contrary, he closed all the doors harshly, drawing the public’s reaction even more. The reasons for this situation can be examined from many different perspectives. Although the Shah was a ‘democratic’ leader, he was maintaining the continuity of a dynasty and the monarchical regime had to provide him with some sort of absolute authority. In other words, one reason can be explained as the Shah’s desire to maintain his own authority and power and to advance his dynasty. According to my research, I do not think that the Shah’s attitude towards the mobilization of society is against the political or social existence of political Islam. As a matter of fact, although Khomeini, who was an Islamic figure, became a symbol of the revolution during the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the reason for being a symbol of the revolution was not because he was an Islamic figure. At that time, opposition to the Shah was a phenomenon perpetuated by many social groups, such as leftists, communists, nationalists. And there was no real anti-Shah leader in the society, all groups had the opportunity to revolt and organize against the Shah’s regime, which they did not want as supporters of Khomeini. So actually, we can say that some kind of consensus has driven society into an Islamic revolution. However, at the end of the revolution, Khomeini’s deportation and execution of leftist, communist and nationalist groups that supported him can be given as an impressive part. This can be given as an example of a kind of ‘pragmatic’ operation of political Islam.[26]
However, while doing my work, I tried to look at the Iranian Revolution from a sociological point of view in order to go into the subtitles of this theory in detail. First of all, since we were talking about a monarchy during the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the participation and representation of the society in politics was very limited, even though it was a constitutional monarchy. For this reason, according to my analysis, no political access was provided to enable social movement in the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Even the Shah’s attempt to close the ‘door’ hard to prevent mobilization completely destroyed the existence of this access. In addition, the framing process, which requires providing a kind of ‘meaning work’[27] in order to be able to attract millions while providing social mobilization, has been used quite successfully by Khomeini. Khomeini’s speeches, which influenced many people since the White Revolution, increased the desire of many people to be involved in this mobilization. He constantly argued that the Shah was pro-Western, he said that his country should be freed from the hands of this imperialist person, and that the monarchy was no longer valid. While making all these statements, he was acting like a populist leader that included all the groups that supported him, unlike his post-revolution stance. Indeed, this is what is necessary for framing, to get the support of as many people as possible while making a discourse for a social movement.[28] In fact, Khomeini was talking about things that people need, such as education, transportation, economy.
In addition, whether the state has the power to suppress mobilization is very important for a social movement. In the early stages of the revolution, as seen in the Jale Square incident, the Shah had all the military power and the police, but he also had a kind of courage and self-confidence to prevent mobilization. However, when the people continued to mobilize even after Jale Square, the power of the Shah was exhausted somewhere and his motivation decreased completely. This indicates the successful completion of the mobilization, and this social movement might not have been successful if the Shah had sufficient strength and motivation to suppress or inhibit the mobilization.[29]
Conclusion
As a result of the the activities of Khomeini, a revolutionary leader like Sayyid QUTB in Egypt, Iran progressed differently from most Islamic organizations and structures, so the analyzes in this study are lacking, especially in contexts such as the Political Process Model and the Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis. The reason for this deficiency is that the revolution in Iran has a unique structure and this structure has progressed differently from the social mobilizations that can normally be observed, rather than structural problems such as lack of data. For example, as stated in the subtitles of the political opportunity structures section of the Political Process Model theory, mobilization requires a ‘half-open door’ so that it is both a deficiency and a motivation for mobilization to occur.[30] However, in the case of Iran, no open-door policy was observed other than the anti-shah policies made during the Mossadeq period, on the contrary, as mentioned above, the door was tried to be closed in order to prevent social mobilization. However, examining the Iranian Islamic Revolution on the basis of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis will only be possible in the post-revolution period, as this process is a revolutionary process and the participation of political Islam in politics in this process could not be observed democratically. As mentioned in the analyzes above, by examining the policies followed by Khomeini in the post-revolutionary period, the level of moderation that may arise in political Islam’s participation in politics can be observed, and thus the necessary data for the hypothesis can be obtained.
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Pargoo, Mahmoud&Akbarzadeh, Shahram. Presidential Elections in Iran: Islamic Idealism Since the Revolution. London: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
Schwedler, Jillian. “Can Islamists become moderates? Rethinking the inclusion-moderation hypothesis.” World Politics 63, no. 2 (2011): 347-376.
Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (2nd ed.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Chapter 5.
“The US and Iran part II – the Shah and the revolution,” the World, 19 December, 2022, https://theworld.org/stories/2004-10-26/us-and-iran-part-ii-shah-and-revolution
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[1] Ahmet, E. D. İ. “İran’da İslam Devrimi Öncesi Siyasi Olaylara Bakış” Ak Devrim ve Lale Meydanı Katliamı”.” Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi 66 (2019): 731-744.
[2] Kuduoğlu, Alptuğ. “İran’da Musaddık Dönemi: 1951-1953.” İran Çalışmaları Dergisi 2, no. 2 (2019): 37-62.
[3] Pargoo, Mahmoud&Akbarzadeh, Shahram. Presidential Elections in Iran: Islamic Idealism Since the Revolution. London: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
[4] Kuduoğlu, “İran’da Musaddık Dönemi,” pp. 37-62.
[5] Ansari, Ali. The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran. London: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[6] Ervand, Abrahamian, “Structural causes of the Iranian Revolution,” Merip Reports 87 (1980): 21-26.
[7] Ali, Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran.
[8] Ahmet, “İran’da İslam Devrimi Öncesi Siyasi Olaylara Bakış,” pp. 731-744.
[9] Ori, Goldberg, Faith and Politics in Iran, Israel, and Islamic State. London: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
[10] Amuzegar, “Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis’ triumph and tragedy,”
[11] Ahmet, E. D. İ. “İran’da İslam Devrimi Öncesi Siyasi Olaylara Bakış” pp. 731-744.
[12] “İran İslam Devrimi 40. yılında: Şah karşıtı solculara ne oldu?” BBC News, 19 December 2022, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-47128818
[13] “İran İslam Devrimi 40. yılında: Şah karşıtı solculara ne oldu?”
[14] “İran İslam Devrimi 40. yılında: Şah karşıtı solculara ne oldu?”
[15] “İran İslam Devrimi 40. yılında: Şah karşıtı solculara ne oldu?”
[16] Kuduoğlu, “İran’da Musaddık Dönemi: 1951-1953,” pp. 37-62.
[17] Eligür, “Political Islam,” pp. 1-6.
[18] “The US and Iran part II – the Shah and the revolution,” the World, 19 December, 2022, https://theworld.org/stories/2004-10-26/us-and-iran-part-ii-shah-and-revolution
[19] Heather, Wagner, The Iranian Revolution. New York: Chelsea House Publications, 2010.
[20] Eligür, “Political Islam,” pp. 1-6.
[21] “İran İslam Devrimi 40. yılında: Şah karşıtı solculara ne oldu?”
[22] Amuzegar, “Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis’ triumph and tragedy”
[23] Ahmet, “İran’da İslam Devrimi Öncesi Siyasi Olaylara Bakış” pp. 731-744.
[24] Wagner, The Iranian Revolution.
[25] Eligür, “Political Islam,” pp. 1-6.
[26] Amuzegar, Dynamics of the Iranian revolution: The Pahlavis’ triumph and tragedy.
[27] Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. “Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment.” Annual review of sociology (2000): 611-639.
[28] Ibid. pp. 611-639.
[29] Ahmet, “İran’da İslam Devrimi Öncesi Siyasi Olaylara Bakış” pp. 731-744.
[30] Mayer, N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.