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THE EUROPEAN UNION’S APPROACH, EXPECTATIONS AND PRECONDITIONS REGARDING TURKEY’S EU CANDIDACY AND THE POLITICAL AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY BETWEEN 1995 AND 2013

Turkey’s volatile relations with the European Union (EU) and the candidacy process are crucial for the analysis of Turkish foreign policy and the dynamics of its recent history. In this direction, this paper will discuss the European Union’s stance against and expectations from Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union and the political and structural transformation of Turkey between 1995 and 2005. After briefly touching upon the period between 1959, the year Turkey applied for an associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC)[1], and 1995, the year Customs Union Agreement was signed between Turkey and the EU, the focus will be the period between signing of the Customs Union Agreement (1995) and beginning of accession negotiations in 2005. The main puzzle that is aimed to shed light on, which consists of mutual expectations and reactions of the EU and Turkey, is guided through the following questions from the viewpoints of both sides: Had Turkey demonstrated the adequate transformation politically and structurally to meet the criteria and rules set by the EU? Had the EU set aside all prospective biases in the process of Turkey’s candidacy and way to accession negotiations? How had EU’s and its member states’ approach differed from each other? In line with these questions, this paper argues that the EU the governmental changes and interests of the members of the European Union extended Turkey’s path to accession more than it should have.

In the path leading to these questions, it is necessary to examine the dynamics of the relations between the EEC (the current EU) and Turkey between 1963-1995. Turkey, applied to the ECC in 1959 and became an associate member with the Ankara Agreement in 1963. In 1973, the relations that were suspended in 1970 were reactivated[2]. However, these processes had not been smooth. The associate membership process Turkey applied for in 1959 and the protocol signed in 1973 were the years when Turkey’s newly established democracy was shaken by military interventions to the government. Relations continued to become tense with Turkey’s Cyprus intervention in the early 1970s, and this tension took a completely different dimension with the internal turmoil caused by the far-right and the far-left political and social actions as well as discourses that were against human rights, destabilized administration and finally the 1980 military coup[3]. Later, during Turgut ÖZAL’s term, Turkey’s approach to the European Economic Community had become more ambitious and decisive. However, the formal application made in 1987 was rejected in 1989[4].

 The period which this article focuses on starts with the signing of two foundational agreements[5], the Association Agreement signed in 1993 and Customs Union Agreement signed in 1995 and became effective in 1996. Nevertheless, for a full membership Turkey had to fulfil the 1993 Copenhagen criteria[6] which established the framework for candidate members over issues of democracy, human rights, rule of law, protection of minorities, and economy.[7] Turkey was again left off the list of potential candidates a year later, in 1997, which was a disappointment[8].  However, it was declared to be eligible shortly after, in 1999, for application of full membership in Helsinki EU Summit.[9] Why did Europe change its stance in only 2 years despite any major improvements in Turkey?[10] Before 1999, the main opponents of Turkey’s candidacy were Greece and Germany. However, MUFTI and MCLAREN explain[11] the two-year improvement with the following reasons: Firstly, the far-right foreign minister of Greece was replaced by the more pragmatic George PAPANDREOU and a demand for a reduction in defense expenditures emerged; secondly, the desire to maintain a particular political capital within the EU for the future; and lastly, the sympathy felt for Turkey because of the disastrous earthquake of 1999. Another reason was that the Christian Democrats of Germany, who opposed Turkey’s candidacy because it was ‘culturally incompatible’ with the EU[12], were replaced by an SPD-Green government. German Foreign Minister FISCHER in 2005 stated that if Turkey was won by the EU, it would also be a great gain in war against terrorism of early 2000s[13]. Furthermore, because of Turkey’s geostrategic importance, Britain was a strong supporter of its candidacy in the early 2000s[14].

Turkey’s political reform appeared to be progressing at a remarkable pace as the crucial EU-Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 approached. In 2001 Gunter VERHEUGEN, the EU Commissioner for enlargement at the time, stated that it is a question of securing long-term liberal democratic frameworks and ensuring that true reform is sustainable. However, he added that it will be Turkey itself to determine the timeline and pace of this transformation.[15] The possibility of Turkey joining the EU has acted as a drive for the implementation of an ambitious, yet unfinished, domestic reform plan that has adducted Turkey to the pattern of liberal democracy.  On the EU side, the argument over Turkey’s membership has served as a model for a wider and lengthy discussion regarding EU’s future.[16] On Turkey’s side, before Justice and Development Party had been elected to the government in 2002, those who feared that approaching the EU would harm the notion of national sovereignty disagreed with those who argued that there could be a link established between the Kemalist imperative of modernity and Europeanization.[17] JDP, which was elected to the government in 2002 in the middle of intense relations with the EU, had faithfully followed the route to accession and implemented the requirements of IMF stability package of 1999, which included liberalization of financial and energy industries, welfare, and tax policy, and expanded international investment access.[18] It  also persuaded more than 54 constitutional and statute revisions between December 2002 and March 2003.[19] The goal of constitutional changes was to amend the 1982 Constitution’s illiberal nature. Between 1995 and 2004, the Constitution was amended eight times. [20] The reform plan enacted in August 2002 altered Turkey’s conception of citizenship and national identity considerably. Acknowledgement of other languages challenged the nationalist notions of society, politics, and culture, allowing alternative modes of identities to thrive. JDP implemented a series of reforms that included the recognition of other languages with respect to freedom of speech and expression, and the strengthening of civilian oversight over the military[21], release of political prisoners, and abolition of death penalty[22] These measures have increased the perception of human rights’ value in Turkey, as per findings of a survey reported in 2003, there has been a notable improvement inside the perception of human rights.[23]

Following considerable efforts by Turkey and several favorable and unfavorable declarations by European politicians, such as former French President D’ESTAING condemning Ankara’s supporters to be ‘enemies of integration’[24], the Copenhagen Summit opted to postpone the accession negotiations until December 2004.[25] Once the accession negotiations finally started in 2005, EU set 35 chapters for Turkey to fulfil, which addressed topics such as free movement, the environment, and competition policy, as well as justice. However, only four were closed until Abdullah GÜL had been elected to the presidency.[26] With respect to the guiding questions of the main puzzle, a final question regarding this process is: Had the governmental changes and interests of the members of the European Union extended Turkey’s path to accession more than it should have? After a long wait and preparation between 1995-2005, a slowdown has been observed in the negotiations since 2006[27]. Although the slow progress of the democratic transformation is among the reasons for this, it is necessary to look at the European Union to understand the answers to the above-mentioned questions. The major reasons are that the returning German Christian Democrats brought back the stance before 1999, the French, who had always taken a negative stance, emphasized that they should not go beyond the ‘special partnership’ with the Germans[28], and most importantly, Turkey’s insistence on not making any concessions regarding the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, although the closing of the opened chapters progressed slowly and there were slowdowns in Turkey’s transformation, this paper concludes that the EU has granted the opportunity to start the accession negotiations later than it should have had, undermining the transformation Turkey had undergone in 10 years.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] Ian Bache et al., Politics in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 530.

[2] “Chronology of Turkey- European Union Relations (1959 – Ab,” accessed May 30, 2022, https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/birimler/kpb/chronology-_en-_1959-_ocak2020.pdf , 2.

[3] Ioannis N Grigoriadis, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): pp. 147-160, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2006.0009 , 148-149.

[4]“Chronology of Turkey- European Union Relations 1959 – Ab”

https://www.ab.gov.tr/siteimages/birimler/kpb/chronology-_en-_1959-_ocak2020.pdf

[5] “EU Trade Relations with Turkey.” Trade.

Retrieved by: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/turkey_en#:~:text=EU%2DTurkey%20trade%20relations%20are,buthttps://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/turkey_en#:~:text=EU%2DTurkey%20trade%20relationshttps://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/turkey_en#:~:text=EU%2DTurkey%20trade%20relations%20are,but%20have%20not%20advanced%20recently.%20are,but%20have%20not%20advanced%20recently.%20have%20not%20advanced%20recently

[6] Copenhagen European Council – 21-22 June 1993, April 22, 1998 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm

[7] Peter Tempel, “Enlargement: Turkey’s Accession to the EU.” Insight Turkey 2, no. 4 (2000): 109–15, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26299935 , 109-110.

[8] Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Lauren Mclaren, “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey,” Journal of European Integration 25, no. 1 (2003): pp. 17-30, https://doi.org/10.1080/0703633031000077181 , 17.

[9]“Turkey.” European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.

Retrieved by: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/negotiations-status/turkey_en

[10] Müftüler Bac and Mclaren in ‘’Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey’’ notes that the Freedom House ranking was still low and economic instability persisted (28).

[11]Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Lauren Mclaren, “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey,” Journal of European Integration 25, no. 1 (2003): pp. 17-30, https://doi.org/10.1080/0703633031000077181 , 23.

[12] Ian Bache et al., Politics in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 531.

[13] “Fischer: Turkey Is a Strategic Partner for Europe.” Hürriyet.

https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/fischer-turkey-is-a-strategic-partner-for-europe-197386

[14] Ian Bache et al., Politics in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 531.

[15] Günter Verheugen, “Prospects for Turkey’s Accession to the EU.” Insight Turkey 3, no. 2 (2001): 59–64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26300033, 64.

[16] Grigoriadis, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever,” 147.

[17] Grigoriadis, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever,” 150.

[18] Cemal Karakas, “Post-Islamists or Islamists? Objectives and Actions of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).” Turkey: Islam and Laicism Between the Interests of State, Politics, and Society. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (2007) http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14537.10 , 32.

[19] Karakas, “Post-Islamists or Islamists? Objectives and Actions of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)”, 31.

[20] Kivanç Ulusoy, “Governing Turkey towards the European Union,” Society and Economy 30, no. 2 (January 2008): pp. 339-358, https://doi.org/10.1556/socec.30.2008.2.12 , 351.

[21] Ulusoy, “Governing Turkey towards the European Union”, 351.

[22] Paul Kubicek, “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities’’, 70.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672734 

[23] Necati Polat, “Identity Politics and the Domestic Context of Turkey’s European Union Accession,” Government and Opposition 41, no. 4 (2006): pp. 512-533, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2006.00202.x , 519.

[24] “Turkey Must Be Kept out of the Union, Giscard Says.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, November 9, 2002. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/09/turkey.eu

[25] Grigoriadis, “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever,” 149.

[26]  “Never Mind Brexit Scaremongering – Turkey Is a Long Way from Joining the EU.” EUROPP, May 22, 2016.

https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/05/14/never-mind-brexit-scaremongering-turkey-is-a-long-way-from-joining-the-eu/

[27] Ian Bache et al., Politics in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 532.

[28] “Turkey Not Fit for EU Accession: Sarkozy: DW: 26.02.2011.” https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-not-fit-for-eu-accession-sarkozy/a-14875593.